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Power and Public Utilities
The Horses Have Bolted, But Close the Barn Doors




Public Utilities Code §§ 216, 330, 377 (amended).
ABxl 6 (Dutra); 2001 STAT. Ch. 2.
"I take credit, frankly, for having launched deregulation, for
being the first in the nation. I was aware at the time I signed the
bill that some of the compromises made it a less than perfect
piece of free-market legislation . .. I counted on the Legislature
and the Public Utilities Commission to remedy whatever flaws
they found. "'
I. INTRODUCTION
True to Governor Wilson's admonition, AB 1890, enacted in 1996, and the
deregulation it brought about were indeed "less than perfect."2 Moreover, his
faith in the Legislature and the Public Utilities Commission was misplaced.3 The
restructuring of California's electrical utility markets, in effect since 1998, has
had disastrous consequences.4 On June 14, 2000, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company (PG&E) interrupted service to almost 100,000 of its customers in the
San Francisco Bay Area for the first time in its history This was just the
beginning of California's electricity problems.6 In the summer of 2000, wholesale
1. Mark Katches, Ex-Governor Won't Take Blame for Energy Crisis, ORANGE COUNTY REG., Feb. 8,
2001, at A l (quoting Governor Pete Wilson).
2. Id.
3. See infra note 13 and accompanying text (noting that the regulatory agencies failed to make
appropriate corrections in the market structure).
4. See generally Adam Bryant, California Powers Down: Thanks to New Plants, Things Will Go Better
in Texas, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 22, 2001, at 48 (describing some of the consequences of the power crisis to small
business consumers).
5. CALIFORNIA BUREAU OF STATE AUDITS, ENERGY DEREGULATION: THE BENEFITS OF COMPETITION
WERE UNDERMINED BY STRUCTURAL FLAWS IN THE MARKET, UNSUCCESSFUL OVERSIGHT, AND
UNCONTROLLABLE COMPETITIVE FORCES, at 5 (2001) [hereinafter AUDIT].
6. Id.
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prices for electrical power in California increased an average of 270 percent over
the prices in place for the same period in 1999. 7 As a result of deregulation,
PG&E and Southern California Edison (SCE) were unable to pass on these
wholesale cost increases to their customers,8 bringing both companies to the
brink of bankruptcy by December of 2000.9 As Governor Gray Davis put it,
deregulation has been a "colossal and dangerous failure."'
When he signed legislation restructuring the electrical industry, Governor
Wilson knew the plan was flawed." However, he relied on the various regulatory
agencies and the Legislature to fine-tune the bill. 2 Collectively, these agencies
were unsuccessful in making needed changes. 3 Chapter 2 is one of many-if
belated-attempts made by the Legislature to correct some of the known flaws of
deregulation. 4
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
While many Californians decry the effects of deregulation now,'5 there was
little but unbridled optimism when deregulation was first implemented. 6 In fact,
the concept has been successfully applied to the communications, transportation,
and financial industries over the past two decades. ' Even deregulation of powerhas been accomplished successfully in England"5 and, more recently, in other
7. CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY OPTIONS AND
CHALLENGES: REPORT TO GOVERNOR GRAY DAVIS, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY at 1, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/
published/report/Executive-Summary.htm (last visited July 9, 2002) [hereinafter EXECUTIVE SUMMARY] (copy
on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
8. AUDIT, supra note 5, at 5.
9. Id. at6.
10. Bryant, supra note 4, at 48.
11. Katches, supra note 1, at Al.
12. Id.
13. See AUDIT, supra note 5, at 39-42 (noting that the Independent System Operator (ISO) and the
Power Exchange both noticed potential problems with the marketplace but that the California Public Utilities
Commission (CPUC) and FERC were slow to respond, and, when they did respond, they did so only
incrementally).
14. See id. at 69-82 (detailing the various executive orders and bills regarding deregulation that have
been passed or were considered by the California Legislature).
15. See A Shocking Backlash: Power Deregulation Under Attack: Inspired by Britain's Success,
California Led the United States into the Brave New World of Liberalised Electricity Markets. What Went
Wrong?, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 26, 2000 [hereinafter Backlash] (describing the reaction of some consumers
affected by the electricity crisis).
16. See GOVERNOR'S OFFICE OF COMMUNICATION, CALIFORNIA'S ENERGY STORY A CHRONOLOGY
1976-2001, May 4, 2001 at 41 [hereinafter GOVERNOR'S REPORT] (quoting an article in Electricity Utility Week
from September 30, 1996). AB 1890, the bill that deregulated California's utility market, passed unanimously in
both houses of the California Legislature. California: Legislature Approves Bill to Deregulate Electricity
Market, WEST LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 4, 1996, available at 1996 WL 496502 (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review).
17. Richard A. Posner, The Effects of Deregulation on Competition: The Experience of the United
States, 23 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 7, S8 (2000).
18. See Backlash, supra note 15 (noting that the deregulation of electricity in Great Britain has been
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states, even though they were wary of following California's example.' 9 In its
simplest form, deregulation is designed to open up to the free market what
previously had been controlled by the government 0 This should-and usually
does-lead to more competition." Typically, greater competition is a boon to
2
consumers because it leads to better service and lower prices.
What went wrong? It is a simple question with as many answers as there are
experts. 3 Largely, the current situation is a combination of man-made error and
bad luck.24 Under the generally accepted starting point, the price increases were
caused by a dramatic increase in demand coupled with a negligible or non-
existent increase in supply.25 Beyond these basic assumptions, however, there is
wide disagreement about the causes of the failure of deregulation in California. 6
The history of regulation in the utility industry can be broken down into three
distinct stages.27 First, there was the traditional "command and control" model,
where the investor-owned utilities 8 provided power and charged rates governed
by the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC).29 Chapter 854, enacted by
Assembly Bill 1890 (commonly known as AB 1890), restructured the electric
industry, and a transitional period, due to end by December of 2001, followed.30
The electric industry never emerged from the transitional period, and the future-
relatively smooth).
19. See Bryant, supra note 4, at 48 (noting that many states measure their deregulation by the differences
between their plan and that followed by California).
20. See CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, CHAPTER 2 CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRIC SYSTEM, at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/industry/environment/historical+information/ceqa+electric+restructuring/chapter
2.htm (last visited on July 9, 2002) [hereinafter CPUC CHAPTER 2 REPORT] (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (describing the structure of the new market mechanism and its goals).
21. See, e.g., The Electric Acid Test, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 29 [hereinafter Acid Test]
(noting the successful deregulation of the telecommunications industry).
22. Id.
23. See AUDIT, supra note 5, at 88 (listing some of the agencies who have identified or tried to identify
the cause of the crisis, the solution, or both and describing how these regulatory agencies differed in their
analysis of the energy crisis).
24. Bryant, supra note 4, at 48.
25. See AUDIT, supra note 5, at 88 (showing that all of the major regulatory agencies agreed that at least
these two factors were major contributors to the current crisis).
26. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting that there is vast disagreement about the causes of
the crisis).
27. See generally GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16 (describing, in detail, the chronology of power
management in California).
28. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, 1996 ELECTRICITY REPORT, at 5 (1996) [hereinafter 1996
ELECTRICITY REPORT] (noting that there are seven investor-owned utilities in California). This article focuses
on the largest investor-owned utilities: Pacific Gas & Electric Company (PG&E), Southern California Edison
(SCE), and San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E).
29. See CALIFORNIA PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, CHAPTER 1 CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRIC SYSTEM, at
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/static/industry/environment/historical+information/ceqa+electric+restructufing/chapter
1.htm (last visited on July 9, 2002) [hereinafter CPUC CHAPTER 1 REPORT] (copy on file with the McGeorge
Law Review) (describing the structure of regulation prior to the enactment of AB 1890).
30. 1996 ELECTRICITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 6.
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the third stage-of the deregulated industry is still in flux.3'
A. Existing Law-AB 1890 Generally
When deregulation first took effect in 1998, AB 1890 ended the investor-
owned utilities' status as closely regulated monopolies, and a competitive market
mechanism was supposed to control the generation of electricity.32 This system
worked much as anticipated from its implementation in March of 1998 until the
summer of 2000."3 In May of 2000, however, the markets began behaving in an
unpredicted way.34 The transitional period-as it was expected to work-then
ended, and a new, though not entirely unforeseen, reality emerged.3"
The man-made errors began with the deregulation bill, AB 1890, itself.36 The
key provisions of restructuring as enacted by AB 1890 were (1) the creation of
the Independent System Operator to administer California's transmission system
(hereinafter "the grid"); (2) the creation of a Power Exchange as a one-stop
wholesale market for power sold within California; (3) the requirement that the
investor-owned utilities buy their power in the day-ahead market of the Power
Exchange; and (4) a mandatory, bond-financed ten-percent rate reduction for all
customers while freezing retail rates.37
AB 1890 was a bipartisan measure.38 In fact, the utilities were heavily
involved in the process leading to deregulation, gaining key concessions in the
legislation.39 By its own terms, AB 1890 prohibited utilities from signing long-
40term power contracts, but it did not require that they sell their generation assets.
31. See generally GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 27 (describing the extraordinary measures
being taken to solve the energy crisis and mentioning the bankruptcy of the Power Exchange, the entity created
to serve as the wholesale energy market in the new deregulated marketplace). See also infra notes 132-34 and
accompanying text (noting that ongoing issues in federal bankruptcy court could change the impact of this bill
and affect the CPUC's ability to regulate the investor-owned utilities).
32. See CPUC CHAPTER 2 REPORT, supra note 20 (describing the new market structure and its
objectives in great detail).
33. See GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 203 (describing the dramatic price increases seen in the
summer of 2000).
34. See id. at 204 (describing cost increases between 1999 and 2000).
35. See generally AUDIT, supra note 5, at 41 (explaining that both the ISO and the Power Exchange
monitoring groups reported errors to the CPUC). For compelling evidence that several regulatory authorities
knew not only that the market was flawed but the exact ways in which it was flawed, see id. at 43.
36. See When the Lights Go Out: Don't Blame Deregulation for the Chaos in California's Electricity-
Supply Industry. Blame "Deregulation," THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 20, 2001 [hereinafter Lights Go Out]
(describing the regulatory structure that was put on top of the existing regulatory structure and the problems this
layered regulatory environment caused).
37. See CPUC CHAPTER 2 REPORT, supra note 20, at 5 (describing the CPUC's decision to freeze retail
rates, one of the cornerstones deregulation).
38. GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 41-42.
39. See Lights Go Out, supra note 36 (noting that the investor-owned utilities successfully pushed for a
way to recoup so-called "stranded costs" of inefficient generation assets).
40. See generally CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330 (West Supp. 2002) (dictating the terms of electrical
restructuring under AB 1890).
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Although restructuring policies did not require divestiture, the CPUC's
"preferred policy"4 ' called for voluntary divestiture of the investor-owned
41
utilities' generation assets in order to mitigate the exercise of market power.
B. The Effect of the Sale of Generation Assets on the CPUC's Jurisdiction
The key aspect of deregulation addressed by Chapter 2 is the CPUC's
recommendation that the investor-owned utilities sell their generation assets.43
The disposition of generation assets owned by the investor-owned utilities is
governed by section 851 of the Public Utilities Code." Section 851 provides, in
pertinent part, that: "[n]o public utility.., shall sell.., or otherwise dispose
of... its... property necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the
public .... While section 851 itself was unaffected by restructuring under AB
1890, the effect of that section on the standard by which the valuation and
disposition of utility-owned generation assets occurred was markedly different. 6
The investor-owned utilities sold a number of facilities according to the CPUC's
market valuation approach and currently own less than fifty percent of their
original generation assets.
Prior to AB 1890, there was little in the way of a wholesale market in
California because over ninety percent of the State's power was generated within
the State and regulated by the CPUC.4s While retail rates are the purview of the
individual states, the regulation of wholesale power falls under the jurisdiction of
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC).49 The Power Exchange was,
by definition, a wholesale electricity market. 5° Thus, after the implementation of
AB 1890 in 1998, all of the power sold into the Power Exchange was considered
wholesale, whether or not it came from the investor-owned utilities' in-state
41. See CPUC CHAPTER 2 REPORT, supra note 20 (describing the preferred policy as presented to the
Legislature).
42. Id.
43. See CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 330(l)(2) (West Supp. 2002) (describing the transition to a competitive
marketplace by way of commission-approved "market valuation mechanisms").
44. Id. § 851 (West 1975 & Supp. 2002).
45. Id.
46. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ENERGY COSTS AND AVAILABILITY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
AB IX 6, at 2 (Jan. 11, 2001) (explaining that under deregulation, the generation assets were subject to disposal
through the market valuation method, but that, under Chapter 2, they will again be subject to the strictures of
section 851 of the Public Utilities Code).
47. Id.
48. See CPUC CHAPTER 1 REPORT, supra note 29 (describing the sources of California's electricity
generation supply).
49. Id. The FERC is an independent regulatory agency within the Department of Energy that regulates
energy transactions relating to interstate commerce. Id.
50. See CPUC CHAPTER 2 REPORT, supra note 20 (describing the transition from the command-and-
control market in existence prior to AB 1890 to the competitive wholesale market that would exist in the newly-
created Power Exchange).
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generation or from other sources.' Though the CPUC remained responsible for
the regulation of retail rates," the direct consequence of the creation of the
wholesale power market in the Power Exchange, coupled with the divestiture of
the investor-owned utilities' generation assets, was a significant transfer of
jurisdiction from the CPUC to the FERC 3
C. Supply and Demand
For years prior to deregulation, the Western United States had a surplus of
generation capacity. 4 During times of heavy demand-the summer months
generally--California has traditionally imported hydroelectric power from the
northwest.5 Additionally, states in the southwest, notably Arizona, overbuilt
supply, 6 leading to rates as low as one cent per kilowatt hour. This, coupled
with conservation measures reduced per capita consumption, and there was no
urgent need for new power plants." As a result, no major power plants were built
in California in the past decade and little new generation capacity was built at
all.5 9
The roaring economy of the middle to late 1990s was completely unforeseen
when deregulation was first designed during the recession years of the early
90s. 0 During the boom years of the late 90s, however, demand in both regions-
especially in the northwest-increased dramatically, thereby diminishing the
• • 61
supply of surplus power available for sale to California.
51. Id.
52. AUDIT, supra note 5, at 12. As discussed herein, inelastic response to prices, caused primarily by the
CPUC-imposed retail rate freeze, is considered one of the contributing factors to the crisis. Id. at 35-36.
53. CALIFORNIA PUBIC UTILITIES COMMISSION, CALIFORNIA'S ELECTRICITY OPTIONS AND
CHALLENGES: REPORT TO GRAY DAVIS, at http:www/cpuc.ca.gov/published/report/Gov-Report.htm (last
visited July 9, 2001) [hereinafter OPTIONS AND CHALLENGES] (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review)
(noting that the creation of a wholesale market for California's power needs involved FERC a great deal more
than before restructuring).
54. See GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 22 (describing some of the reasons that there was little
or no need to construct additional generation facilities).
55. See CPUC CHAPTER I REPORT, supra note 29 (describing the give-and-take of power supplies in the
western region and how the system remained balanced for many years with little or no requirement to increase
generation capacity).
56. See GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 22 (noting that the Southwest overbuilt coal-fired plants
to meet demand that did not materialize).
57. Id. at 23.
58. Id. at 22.
59. See id. at 23 (noting that only twelve small plants were licensed, three of which were never built).
60. See Bryant, supra note 4, at 48 (describing the economic conditions surrounding the decision to
deregulate California's electricity market). For an analysis of the foreseeability of the demand increase and the
inadequacy of California's economic models, see P. Joskow & E. Kahn, A Quantitative Analysis of Pricing
Behavior in California's Wholesale Market During Summer 2000 (Jan. 15, 2001) [hereinafter Joskow & Kahn].
61. CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION, POPULATION INCREASES & ELECTRICITY GROWTH IN WESTERN
STATES, at http://www.energy.ca.gov/electricity/poplation-electricity.html (last visited on July 9, 2002) (copy
on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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Excessive supply regionally, however, does not adequately explain the total
failure by anyone in California to build a major new power plant.62 The investor-
owned utilities, for their part, were instructed by the CPUC to divest their
generation assets and were not given any incentives to build more plants to
replace aging and inefficient ones. 63 Out-of-state generators, on the other hand,
had different concerns. 4 Given the fact that any new plants they built would
compete with the generation they had just purchased, these new companies were
actually given a disincentive to build new power plants.6 Additionally, California
has long had the toughest environmental laws in the United States---so stringent
in fact, that planning and building a power plant in the state can take up to seven
years. 67 Because of the lack of incentive to build new plants coupled with the
uncertainty surrounding deregulation, regulators should not have been surprised
68that generators were reluctant to build new plants.
The reduced out-of-state supplies and higher-than-average demand during a
period of unseasonable heat and lower-than-average rainfall created a situation in
which power supplies were dangerously low. 69 A basic supply and demand curve
shows that as supplies tighten-assuming demand remains constant-prices
rise.7° If, as was the case, demand rises and supplies tighten or remain constant,
prices also rise.7 Therefore, whoever controls the supply also has some control of
the price. 72 After the investor-owned utilities sold their generation assets,
independent companies, with very different business models than the investor-
owned utilities, controlled nearly thirty percent of the State's electricity demand
requirements."
62. See AUDIT, supra note 5, at 55 (describing the various market forces that existed and noting that
these alone do not explain the entire price increase seen in the summer of 2000).
63. See Sacramento Municipal Utility District, Power Struggles, at http://www.smud.cominfo/dereg/
part-.l/d-shortage.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2001) [hereinafter Power Struggles] (copy on file with the
McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the lack of motivation for suppliers to build new power plants).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Backlash, supra note 15.
67. Bryant, supra note 4, at 48.
68. See Power Struggles, supra note 63 (explaining possible reasons that supplies became scarce).
69. See AUDIT, supra note 5, at 55 (describing the climatic conditions responsible for the combined
increase in demand and reduction in available supply).
70. Id. at 19.
71. Id. at 18.
72. See generally id. (describing the econometrics of supply and demand and how it relates to price, and
thus, to market power-the ability to control price).
73. Interview with Tom Greene, State of California Energy Task Force, in Sacramento, Cal. (July 18,
2001) [hereinafter Greene Interview] (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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D. Market Power
Prior to restructuring, the investor-owned utilities were considered a legal
monopoly because they controlled the generation, transmission, and distribution
of power for a particular service area.14 This top-to-bottom type of control is
known as vertical market power.5 If left unchecked, vertical market power can be
used to block competitors' access; in the case of electricity, this entails blocking
access to the transmission system." Prior to deregulation in California, the
investor-owned utilities controlled the vast majority of in-state generation." As a
result, they also possessed horizontal market power." Horizontal market power
results when a single utility controls enough assets to alter the supply-demand
equilibrium and is thus able to increase prices by withholding generation." AB
1890 was designed to prevent the exercise of both types of market power.80
Two provisions of AB 1890 were designed to curb the potential exercise of
vertical market power by the investor-owned utilities." First, AB 1890 required
that all power be bid into the Power Exchange during the transitional period." By
doing so, the CPUC hoped to give the Power Exchange enough depth to make it
truly a competitive marketplace.83 Second, the utilities were required to turn over
control-though not ownership-of the grid to the Independent System
Operator.84 The Legislature designed this transfer of control to the Independent
System Operator in order to prevent the owners of the transmission system (the
investor-owned utilities) from favoring their own generation facilities over non-
utility facilities.85
During the process leading to deregulation, regulators and legislators
generally accepted the notion that direct access to competing generators in the
74. 1996 ELECTRICITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 5.
75. Id. at 24.
76. See CPUC CHAPTER 1 REPORT, supra note 29 (describing the potential control that could be exerted
by the investor-owned utilities to favor certain generation facilities in the use of the transmission lines).
77. See id. (noting that the in-state utilities provided more than eighty percent of the State's total
electricity supply).
78. See id. (describing the effect of a concentrated holding of generation assets by a single owner).
79. Id.
80. See generally id. (explaining the steps taken to prevent the exercise of market power by the investor-
owned utilities).
81. 1996 ELECTRICITY REPORT, supra note 28, at 24. It must be remembered that the decision to
recommend that the investor-owned utilities sell their generation assets, while a key element of restructuring,
was not included within the provisions of AB 1890. See supra note 39 and accompanying text (noting that AB
1890 did not require the sale of the investor-owned utilities' generation assets).
82. See CPUC CHAPTER 2 REPORT, supra note 20 (describing the role of the Power Exchange in the
new marketplace and the requirement that investor-owned utilities sell all of their power into the Power
Exchange during the transition period).
83. Id.
84. See id. (explaining that the ISO's function is to ensure that all generators are treated equally with
regards to accessing "the grid").
85. Id.
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
Power Exchange and measures to prevent misuse of the grid would mean little if
any one generator could exercise sufficient horizontal market power to
manipulate the wholesale price of power or to block other users.86 Thus, the
Legislature established the requirement that investor-owned utilities sell their
generation assets in order to prevent the exercise of horizontal market power.
87
88Despite these precautions, market power was exercised anyway. Moreover,
this exercise of market power was the direct result of a flaw in the design of the
new marketplace. 9 Rather than creating one market through which the
purchasing and selling of wholesale electricity took place, the Power Exchange
and the Independent System Operator operated several markets in sequence.90
The Power Exchange operated the "day ahead" market, designed by deregulation
to be the primary market for wholesale electricity.9' The Independent System
Operator's markets, however, were designed solely for reliability purposes and
were expected to accommodate no more than five percent of the State's
wholesale electricity needs. 9 The resultant sequential market encouraged buyers
to reduce demand in the "day ahead" market and encouraged sellers to reduce the
supply bid into the Power Exchange's "day ahead" market.93 As a result, much of
the energy bought and sold in California shifted to the Independent System
Operator's real-time market, where sellers had a considerable advantage. 94
86. Id. In fact, one of the provisions of AB 1890 allowed the investor-owned utilities to recover so-
called "stranded costs" during the transition period. Id. However, in order to do so, the Legislature required the
investor-owned utilities to turn over control, but not ownership, of their transmission lines to the ISO. Id. In this
way, regulators offered the investor-owned utilities an incentive-one the utilities were required to take-to
transfer control of the grid to the ISO, which regulators hoped would prevent the investor-owned utilities from
exercising market power by blocking access to the transmission facilities. Id.
87. CPUC CHAPTER 2 REPORT, supra note 20; see generally 1996 ELECTRICITY REPORT, supra note 28,
at 24 (noting that horizontal market power results from a "concentration or control of any single aspect, such as
generation....").
88. See generally AUDIT, supra note 5, at 15-38 (describing in detail the actual functioning of the market
and the ways in which the structure of the market allowed participants to use market power to influence the
market clearing price in the Power Exchange).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 16-17 (noting that deregulation required the investor-owned utilities to bid all their power
into the "day ahead" market).
92. See id. (explaining that the ISO's energy imbalance market was created for the procurement of
energy necessary to provide real-time reliability). If the actual demand exceeds the actual supply, the ISO is
required to purchase electricity to balance the system. Id.
93. See id. at 16 (explaining how the relationship between the Power Exchange and the ISO's markets
encouraged under-scheduling).
94. See id. at 22 (noting that by the time demand was bid into the Independent System Operator's real-
time market, the investor-owned utilities were forced to buy enough electricity to meet demand, regardless of
price).
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III. CHAPTER 2
There is little the Legislature can do now to regain the jurisdictional control
given away by deregulation since the generation assets have already been sold
and the creation of a wholesale market is complete. 95 Nevertheless, Chapter 2
seeks to prevent any further divestitures of investor-owned utilities' generation
assets without CPUC review. 96 Chapter 2 clearly accomplishes three things. First,
it cleans up loose language from AB 1890 that created confusion about the
CPUC's ability to regulate nuclear facilities.97 Second, Chapter 2 prevents the
investor-owned utilities from selling any more of their generation assets under
the pure market valuation scheme of AB 1890.9' Third, the bill prohibits the sale
of any generation asset owned by any of the public utilities until March 2006.99
There is a fourth possible effect of Chapter 2 regarding a jurisdictional
issue.' °° Prior to deregulation, utilities were not free to dispose of any asset
"necessary or useful in the performance of its duties to the public."'0 ' Even under
the terms of AB 1890, the investor-owned utilities had to obtain CPUC approval
of their plans for divestiture. °2 When it became clear in December of 2000 that
the investor-owned utilities were facing bankruptcy, legislators became
concerned that a federal bankruptcy trustee-and not the CPUC-would control
the disposition of the investor-owned utilities' remaining generation assets.
10 3
Seeking to avoid this result, Chapter 2 returns to the strict statutory standard for
divestiture utilized before deregulation. " Additionally, Chapter 2 goes one step
further, prohibiting the utilities from selling their generation assets until 2006.05
95. See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, supra note 7, at 3-5 (explaining that turning back the clock on
deregulation is not possible); see also supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (describing the jurisdictional
shift caused by deregulation).
96. ASSEMBLY COMMITrEE ON ENERGY COSTS AND AVAILABILITY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF ABlx6,
at 1 (Jan. 11,2001).
97. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 377 (amended by Chapter 2).
98. Id. §§ 216 & 330(1)(2) (amended by Chapter 2).
99. Id. § 377 (amended by Chapter 2).
100. Interview with John Dutra, Assemblymember, in Sacramento, Cal. (June 7, 2001) [hereinafter
Dutra Interview] (notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
101. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851 (West 1975 & Supp. 2002).
102. See Greene Interview, supra note 73 (stating that "Chapter 2 reaffirms the process for divestiture
under section 851 of the Public Utilities Code.").
103. Id.
104. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON ENERGY COSTS AND AVAILABILITY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF
ABx1 6, at 2 (describing the change from a market valuation system of divestiture to the strict terms of PUC
section 851).
105. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 377 (amended by Chapter 2).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF CHAPTER 2
Chapter 2 seeks not so much to put the genie back in the bottle but, rather, to
plug the hole until a more permanent solution can be found.' ° Not one agency
writing on this crisis identified the sale of the utilities' generation assets as even a
minor cause of the current crisis.' °' There is strong evidence to suggest, however,
that the exercise of market power and the failure of regulators were major
reasons for the dramatic increase in retail power rates in 2000 and 2001.1°,
Chapter 2 clearly addresses the first issue and tangentially addresses the
second. 0
While most of the focus of deregulation was to prevent the investor-owned
utilities from exercising market power, an ironic thing happened: other
generators used the draconian limitations on the investor-owned utilities to their
advantage and they exercised market power instead."0 Chapter 2, by prohibiting
further sales of generation assets owned by the investor-owned utilities, prevents
out-of-state suppliers, many of whom are suspected of exercising market power,
from obtaining a greater slice of the supply pie."' Because the ability of out-of-
state generators to influence the price of electricity depends greatly on the
amount of supply they control, Chapter 2 should prevent the problem from
getting worse until other long-term measures take effect.'12
The FERC, under the Federal Power Act, is responsible for ensuring that
wholesale power rates are fair and reasonable." 3 After the creation of the
wholesale power market in the Power Exchange, the FERC gained much greater
influence over the ultimate price of electricity in California's electrical market.' "
106. See generally GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 39-42 (describing both the short-term
measures taken as well as the long-term measures currently in progress).
107. See AUDIT, supra note 5, at 88 (detailing the key agencies' public ideas regarding the causes of the
electricity crisis).
108. See generally id. (noting that climactic and market changes were insufficient to fully explain the
price increases during the summer of 2000).
109. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (referring to the specific provisions of Chapter 2).
110. See generally Joskow & Kahn, supra note 60 (describing the economics of market power and how
it was probable that generators, without the limitations imposed on them by the CPUC, could manipulate the
market to drive up the price).
111. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (noting that, prior to restructuring, ninety percent of
California's generation supply was provided by the investor-owned utilities). Since the only change in
ownership occurred from the sale of generation assets to out-of-state generators via the market valuation
mechanism, it stands to reason that the only way for those generators to obtain greater market share would be
through further divestiture of generation assets owned by the investor-owned utilities. Chapter 2, by preventing
further divestiture, eliminates this possibility.
112. See GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 28-29 (describing Chapter 2 as one of the measures
designed to stabilize the current crisis).
113. Federal Power Act § 205(a), 16 U.S.C.A. § 791 (stating that "[a]ll rates and charges made,
demanded, or received by any public utility ... shall be just and reasonable .... ").
114. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text (explaining how the creation of the Power
Exchange's wholesale marketplace resulted in a shift in jurisdiction from the CPUC to the FERC).
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The CPUC, however, retained control of retail rates the investor-owned utilities
were permitted to charge their customers."5 Throughout the crisis, the FERC
allowed wholesale prices to be determined by the market,"6 while the CPUC
maintained a retail price freeze.' The utilities were forced to buy energy at the
high wholesale price and sell their electricity at the low retail price, causing them
to lose massive amounts of money and forcing both PG&E and Southern
California Edison to the brink of bankruptcy by December of 2000."'
This tag-team approach to power sales is the hallmark of federalism and
worked well until the formula changed when deregulation was introduced.' 9
Whether it was for lack of preparation or lack of political will, the failure of the
CPUC and the FERC, to properly regulate the markets during the transitional
period is perhaps the most glaring-and ultimately most difficult to accept-
reason for the energy crisis.'20 In and of itself, Chapter 2 does not address the
failure of the various regulatory agencies to mitigate this crisis. However,
Chapter 2 is part of a larger effort, insofar as it prevents any further jurisdictional
erosion, by weaning California's electricity markets from the control of the two
groups blamed by California legislators for the severity of the crisis: out-of-state
investors and the FERC.'2
Finally, according to Assemblymember John Dutra, the author of Chapter 2,
one of the key concerns the Bill was designed to address is the control of the
investor-owned utilities' generation assets should the utilities file for
bankruptcy.'22 Legislators feared that generation assets critical to California's
energy supply could be handed over to a federal bankruptcy trustee.' 23 Judge
Robert Montali, the federal judge conducting the bankruptcy proceedings,
initially noted that "[t]he public interest is better served by deference to the
regulatory scheme and leaving the entire regulatory function to the regulator,"'
'
12
indicating to some that, while the issue was still open, the legislators' fears may
have been unfounded.'
25
115. See AUDIT, supra note 5, at 9-10 (describing the two-tiered regulatory scheme in California).
116. See id. at 35 (describing the FERC's "soft" price caps).
117. Id.
118. See Unplugged, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2000 (describing the utilities' financial difficulties at
the end of 2000).
119. Backlash, supra note 15.
120. See id. (noting that regulators pulled out before the new institutions matured, creating a vacuum).
121. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text (explaining how the creation of the Power
Exchange's wholesale marketplace resulted in a shift in jurisdiction from the CPUC to the FERC).
122. Dutra Interview, supra note 100. PG&E, the largest of the investor-owned utilities, did file for
bankruptcy on April 6,2001; David Lazarus, PG&E in Bankruptcy, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 6, 2001, at Al. On April
7, 2001, SCE and Governor Davis filed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), one component of which
was assistance from the State to prevent SCE from following PG&E into bankruptcy, David Lazarus, Davis
Seals Power Deal With Edison to Buy Lines, S.F. CHRON., Apr. 10, 2001, at Al.
123. Dutra Interview, supra note 100.
124. In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 263 B.R. 306, 323 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2001).
125. See E-mail from Alan W. Kornberg, Attorney-at-Law, to Maximilian Barteau, McGeorge School of
McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 33
V. CONCLUSION
The energy crisis is a complicated subject, made no easier by the number of
agencies involved in the decision-making process.'26 In order for the State to end
this crisis, it must first increase supply to match the increase in demand over the
past ten years.'27 Moreover, the marketplace must be redesigned to prevent the
exercise of market power in the future. ' In the interim, Chapter 2 will prevent
further sale of the investor-owned utilities' generation assets, precluding out-
of-state generators from controlling any more of the state's power supply. 3° If
out-of-state generators are precluded from obtaining a greater slice of the energy
pie and supply is increased, it may be possible to prevent the exercise of market
power, and the competitive market as originally envisaged may yet emerge."'
In addition to these modifications, the jurisdictional structure must be
remedied.'32 As noted above, had the problems that were reported to regulators
been fully addressed when they were initially identified, the power crisis might
have been lessened, or avoided.' Regardless, against a background of
dramatically increased prices and either the unwillingness or inability of FERC to
intervene, 14 Governor Gray Davis and the California Legislature took a number
of steps on their own, one of which is Chapter 2."'
The primary unanswered question, with regard to Chapter 2, is its effect on
PG&E's bankruptcy proceedings.3 6 Throughout the proceedings in bankruptcy
court, PG&E has challenged the CPUC's authority to regulate its retail rates.'37 At
the heart of the utility's argument is that federal bankruptcy law automatically
Law (July 2, 2001) [hereinafter Kornberg E-mail] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the
CPUC's position and that the matter is on-going).
126. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (noting the number of state agencies involved with
electricity regulation).
127. See GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 8-9 (describing the efforts to rapidly create more
generation supply in California).
128. See AUDIT, supra note 5, at 37-38 (recommending various market remedies).
129. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting the provision of Chapter 2 that prevents the
investor-owned utilities from selling their generation assets until 2006).
130. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (concluding that this provision will prevent out-of-state
generators from obtaining greater market share).
131. See generally AUDIT, supra note 5, at 37-38 (describing the many flaws in the actual operation of
the market and ways in which it might be remedied to attain the desired competitive market).
132. See id. at 39 (explaining the interplay between the FERC, the CPUC, the ISO, and the Power
Exchange and how the division of responsibilities left clear, solvable problems unaddressed).
133. See id. at 40 (explaining the findings and the possible steps that could have been taken in response
to those findings to mitigate the crisis).
134. See generally GOVERNOR'S REPORT, supra note 16, at 173-78 (claiming throughout that FERC
failed to follow its legal mandate to ensure that wholesale prices were "fair and reasonable").
135. AUDIT, supra note 5.
136. Komberg e-mail, supra note 125 (noting that the bankruptcy proceedings are on-going).
137. See Carrie Peyton, Judge Rejects PG&E Tactic, SACRAMENTO BEE, Feb. 9, 2002, at A12
(describing PG&E's stance as "all or nothing" and outlining the federal pre-emption issue argued by PG&E).
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pre-empts a wide variety of state laws and regulations.' Thus far, the federal
bankruptcy judge has been willing to defer to California's regulatory structure. 3 9
In fact, in the latest ruling before publication of this article, Judge Montali
strongly criticized the "all or nothing" approach taken by PG&E.'" ° Despite the
strong language and unwavering position Montali has consistently taken, as of
this writing, PG&E continues to maintain that it will meet the standards outlined
by the bankruptcy judge to establish its federal pre-emption claim.' 4' Although
many commentators think the issue has been resolved against PG&E,' 42 the
utility's willingness to fight the ruling has left the future of Chapter 2 in the
hands of the courts.
43
To the extent that it returns the utility industry to its pre-deregulated state,
Chapter 2 is a shift toward another stage, possibly a hybrid of two dichotomous
systems.'" The future of deregulation is unknown.'45 It is unlikely that we will
return to a command-and-control system, but the market has proven an imperfect
means of increasing competition, promoting efficiency, and controlling costs. 144
California's experience suggests, however, that markets may also have their
limits. 41
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144. See Acid Test, supra note 21 (noting that "[d]eregulation will simply not work of its own accord.").
Thus, some regulation may be necessary, even in a competitive market. Id.
145. See Backlash, supra note 15 (remarking that "[wie have one foot in the old regulated world, one
foot in the market, and a Legislature that keeps changing its mind.").
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